The IMF projects global economic growth will decelerate from 3.5% in 2022 to 3.0% in 2023 and 2.9% in 2024, below the historical average of 3.8% over 2000-2019. Growth in advanced economies is expected to slow from 2.6% in 2022 to 1.5% in 2023 and 1.4% in 2024. Growth in emerging markets and developing economies are projected to edge down from 4.1% in 2022 to 4.0% in both 2023 and 2024. Despite signs of resilience earlier this year, economic activity is still below pre-pandemic (January 2020) projections by the IMF (see charts). Several forces are holding back recovery, including long-term consequences of the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and increasing geoeconomic fragmentation. Other forces are cyclical, including effects of monetary policy tightening, withdrawal of fiscal support amid high debt levels, and extreme weather.
Our economic growth forecast is supported by recovering tourism activity and improving private consumption. Economic growth is expected to inch up from 1.8% YoY in Q2 to 2.0% in Q3 and accelerate to 4.7% in Q4 driven by rising foreign tourist arrivals, domestic policy supports, and the low-base effect last year. However, there is downside risk from domestic and external headwinds as well as growing uncertainty
On October 12, the General Secretary of IMF, Kristalina Georgieva, said the IMF was “very closely monitoring how the situation evolves” and how it is affecting oil markets. The IMF Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department, Jihad Azour called the ongoing armed conflict an economic “earthquake” in a panel discussion at the annual conference, saying it will have challenging repercussions for the Middle East and the larger world economy. Bloomberg Economics analyzed the possibly impact on global growth and inflation under three scenarios. In the first, hostilities remain largely confined to Gaza and Israel. In the second, the conflict spills over to neighboring countries like Lebanon and Syria which host powerful Tehran-backed militias — essentially turning it into a proxy war between Israel and Iran. The third involves escalation into a direct military exchange between the two regional enemies; Bloomberg sees low probability of this panning out but it is a dangerous possibility. Soaring oil prices (to $150 a barrel) and plunging prices of risk assets would deal a substantial blow to growth and take inflation a notch higher. It could trigger a global recession with global GDP growth falling to 1.7% in 2024. Excluding Covid and global financial crisis shocks, it would be the worst growth since 1982.
The conflict would hurt the Thai economy through direct channels (via trade and tourism) and indirect channels (surging oil prices, slowing global growth). Given that the Israel-Hamas conflict is “contained” currently, the primary impact would be triggered by rising oil prices.
1. Direct impact: Israel accounts for only 0.3% of Thailand’s total exports, so the impact on trade would be minimal. The impact on tourism would also be limited as tourists from Israel and the Middle East account for only 0.9% and 2.3% of total foreign tourist arrivals in Thailand, respectively.In the worse-case scenario, a “proxy war” would have significant impact on trade. Middle Eastern countries are emerging as potential export markets and are also primary sources of energy imports. Supply chains would be disrupted, which would increase shipping costs and insurance premiums, and delay the delivery of goods.
The Tourism Authority of Thailand’s data show the country welcomed 2.10 mn foreign tourists in September, falling from 2.47 mn in August. In the first nine months of this year, tourist arrivals reached 20 mn (68% of pre-Covid level) and generated THB834 bn receipts (60% of pre-Covid level). Arrivals from Malaysia, Russia, South Korea and India reached 79-111% of pre-pandemic levels. Chinese tourists are returning slowly (29% of pre-Covid level). In the first week of visa-free entry for Chinese tourists (September 24th to October 1st), their arrivals increased by 72.5% from the previous week to 106,472. However, it dropped to 75,093 in the subsequent week, partly due to safety concerns after the shooting at a Bangkok mall on October 3rd. We forecast 28.5mn foreign tourists would visit Thailand this year but that implies there should be over 2.8mn arrivals per month in the last quarter compared to an average of 2.4mn in Q3. The latest mall shooting has made this challenging.
The Ministry of Commerce reported export value expanded for the first time in 11 months in August. However, data from the Bank of Thailand show exports had contracted for the 11th consecutive month, by 1.8% YoY, albeit the magnitude is smaller than in the previous month (-5.5%). This was due to generally higher prices for goods as export volume had continued to shrink. However, many countries in Asia are still see weak exports. Furthermore, the WTO has downgraded its forecast for global trade growth to 0.8% from its previous estimate of 1.7% and forecast global trade would expand by 3.3% in 2024, a notch higher than its previous estimate of 3.2%. Given that the Israel-Hamas conflict is “contained” currently, it is initially projected to have limited direct impact on Thai exports because Israel is Thailand's 40th largest trading partner. In the first 8 months of this year, Thailand's exports to Israel jumped 12.6% YoY to $546 million (0.3% of national export value). Imports from Israel fell 14.2% YoY to $311 million (0.2% of national import value). If the Israel-Hamas conflict is not contained soon, it could increase risks to Thailand’s international trade.
The Private Investment Index fell 3.5% YoY in August, reversing from +1.3 in July. This was mainly due to smaller investments in machinery & equipment, which is reflected in the drop in capital goods imports and slower sales of machinery in Thailand, especially in food & beverage and tobacco sectors. However, the construction sector saw an uptick in investment. Looking ahead, private investment could remain volatile, influenced by the weak export sector, despite positive signs that include (i) Business Sentiment Index (BSI) exceeding-50 in September; (ii) Ministry of Commerce data showing 435 FDI applications in the first 8 months of 2023 with a total value of THB65.8 bn; and (iii) the BOI had approved investment incentives for 1,106 projects (+17% YoY) with a total investment value of THB288 bn (close to the same period last year).
The Private Consumption Index rose by 6.9% YoY in August, slowing from +7.3% in July, mainly due to reduced spending on durable and semi-durable goods categories. In contrast, service spending continued to flourish, supported by the long holiday. For the rest of the year, private consumption is expected to benefit from rising consumer confidence, employment returning to normal levels, and measures to boost purchasing power by reducing energy costs and suspending debt repayment for farmers and small enterprises. However, there are challenges ahead, including high household debt, high interest rates, and the potential impact of drought on agricultural products and farm incomes.
The impact of the Digital Wallet scheme 2024 GDP and inflation would depend on the debt incurred to implement that scheme. The scheme requires THB 560 bn in funding. There are limited details on how it would be financed, so we present two possible scenarios below. The most likely scenario would be a combination of Scenario 1 and 2:
NSO data suggests indebted households with monthly income below THB50,000 and debt-free households with monthly income below THB10,000 have weak purchasing power as total expenses including debt repayments exceed income. The THB 10,000 digital wallet scheme – planned to be implemented in 2024 – would boost these household’s purchasing power significantly but only for a year. It will help those under financial stress (85% of indebted households and 26% of debt-free households) by reducing their expense-to-income ratio to below 100%. However, there would be little impact on high-income households (more than THB50,000 for indebted households) and debt-free households (monthly income above THB10,000) because these households have low marginal propensity to consume (MPC).
The potential risks associated with rising public debt and implicit debt burden triggered by the quasi-fiscal scheme include (i) higher borrowing costs, which could lead to ‘crowding-out’ effect; (ii) a narrower fiscal space, which would limit the ability to implement counter-cyclical measures and to advance growth-promoting policies; and (iii) worsen the country’s stability with a weaker local currency, poor sentiment, and high borrowing costs. These could also trigger a sovereign rating downgrade.